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NO. 44 NOVEMBER 2019 Introduction 
A Geopolitically Aware EU and 
Its Eastern European Neighbours: 
More Realism, More Investment 
Barbara Lippert 
The future European Commission under President Ursula von der Leyen claims to 
be a geopolitical Commission. Sceptics note that this ambition will only further 
broaden the well-known gap between the capabilities of the EU and the expectations 
about its ability to shape foreign policy. Others welcome the fact that the “geopoliti-
cal commission” wants to emerge from the shadow of technocratic politics. However, 
the postponement by EU member states in starting accession negotiations with North 
Macedonia in October 2019 is being viewed from this perspective as strategic blind-
ness. The EU should not jeopardise its strategic opportunities in the neighbourhood, 
which will soon include the United Kingdom, by sticking to its established enlarge-
ment and neighbourhood policy. Instead, it should create new structures and invest 
more, both in political and material terms. One could imagine a European Political 
and Economic Area (EPEA) consisting of the EU and Eastern European countries of 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP). 
 
The controversy in the EU over the start of 
accession negotiations with North Macedo-
nia and Albania goes beyond these concrete 
cases and points to more fundamental 
problems of the Union in dealing with its 
European neighbours. For several reasons, 
the EU stands only half-heartedly by its 
political commitments to the countries of 
the Western Balkans to take them in: The 
EU is losing its willingness and capacity 
to welcome countries that will neither 
strengthen the Union’s economic power 
nor its political cohesion. The EU’s absorp-
tion capacity is also diminishing because 
the fundamentals as well as performance 
of its integration policy are being challenged 
both internally and externally. This corre-
sponds to a decreasing appetite for reform 
in candidate countries that are pursuing 
their own policies of conditionality towards 
the EU. Thus, for core areas of reform such 
as good governance (separation of powers, 
independence of the judiciary, fight against 
corruption) and functioning statehood, they 
are making their rate of progress dependent 
on the pace of the pre-accession or acces-
sion process. They are also counting on 
Brussels’ concerns about foreign and secu-
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rity policy and its interest in continuing 
the enlargement process in order to stabilise 
the EU’s neighbouring states. At the same 
time, the accession candidates are playing 
offers from “geopolitical competitors” 
against the EU, a situation that the Com-
mission under Jean-Claude Juncker regis-
tered in its May 2019 Communication on 
Enlargement Policy. 
Blaming each other for stagnation and 
regression will not help the EU if it wants to 
accept countries that are ready for member-
ship or help in achieving its goal of being 
surrounded by responsibly governed coun-
tries with the same values. Similarly unpro-
ductive engagement patterns, as with the 
Balkan states, are already emerging with 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, with which 
the EU has the closest ties in the Eastern 
Partnership. At the EaP anniversary summit 
in May 2019, EU member states refused to 
make any political accession promises, as 
they had made the Western Balkan coun-
tries in Thessaloniki in 2003. In addition, 
the EU must quickly settle its new neigh-
bourhood relations with the United King-
dom after Brexit and find an alternative 
to the negotiating framework for accession 
with Turkey. It should use these circum-
stances to create the possibility for new, 
realistic policy approaches. 
Mandate and Lessons for the EU 
For the foreseeable future, the EU will 
be the dominant economic – and hence 
political – force in Europe as a whole, 
affecting its neighbours to the north, east, 
and south. This gives the EU a mandate to 
structure these relationships, especially with 
regard to countries that have distanced them-
selves from it (see Turkey and the United 
Kingdom) and are in a stronger position vis-
à-vis the EU than countries of the Eastern 
Partnership that seek maximum proximity 
to it, such as Ukraine and Georgia. The 
latter also expect protection and prosperity 
from the EU – ideally, as part of the EU – 
due to their volatile domestic political land-
scapes and precarious security situations. 
For the Union, it is a matter of establishing 
qualified or privileged relations with these 
neighbours below the level of membership 
(and, if necessary, also with countries of the 
Western Balkans). 
Before embarking on new paths, the EU 
should heed two recent lessons: first, Mos-
cow’s interventions, which, in 2013, ini-
tially prevented the signing of an Associa-
tion Agreement that included a deepened 
and comprehensive free trade area (AA/ 
DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine. These 
interventions have revealed that the long-
term technocratic-gradualist policy of ever 
closer association has lost its supposed geo-
political innocence. Whether in South-East 
or Eastern Europe, the EU must expect such 
reactions. It should be capable of handling 
conflicts at various levels – normative, 
economic, security policy – if it encounters 
resistance, especially from Russia. Second, 
the accession negotiations with Turkey, 
which have never really got off the ground, 
prove that the EU has failed with its am-
bivalent positioning on the question of 
whether it is actually prepared to accept 
the country, provided Ankara fulfils the 
conditions for this. Since 1987 it has been 
divided on the question of accession – for 
various reasons – and has still not been 
able to overcome its disagreements. In the 
past, this led to an enlargement policy 
towards Ankara that was not credible; today 
it means a massive loss of influence – quite 
apart from the fact that Turkey disqualified 
itself for membership some time ago. 
This ambiguity resulting from disagree-
ments is not recommended when dealing 
with countries of the Eastern Partnership. 
The EU should not bring into play unreli-
able commitments of accession, nor force 
itself and the countries into the rigid con-
fines of accession negotiations. 
A European Political and 
Economic Area 
The explicit aim of the EPEA would be to 
establish a visible multilateral link between 
the EU and advanced EaP states that, in the 
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medium term, cannot count on becoming 
EU or NATO members. The offer would 
initially be addressed to Ukraine and 
Georgia, and later to Moldova as well. The 
European Economic Area (EEA, consisting 
of Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein on 
the one hand, and the EU on the other) 
should serve as an inspiration, not a blue-
print, for the EPEA. The latter would have 
to be very different from the EEA in terms 
of (1) political signalling, (2) governance, 
and (3) functional scope. 
(1) The EEA has an administrative-tech-
nocratic profile because the member coun-
tries of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) in the EEA (i.e. Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein) only want economic inte-
gration and not political integration. Many 
Eastern European countries want both, and 
the EPEA should therefore signal that and 
offer them both, as far as it is possible 
below membership level. 
(2) The EEA is a construct of its own that 
is based on international law, without pro-
visions for the transfer of sovereignty. In 
this “joint venture”, the EU retains its deci-
sion-making autonomy (as do the EFTA-EEA 
countries). The EEA should not have supra-
national institutions either, but it should 
have a distinct political profile. Already 
with the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
launched in 2003, the EU announced 
everything for its neighbours except seats 
and votes in EU institutions. Analogous to 
the EFTA pillar in the EEA, an EaP pillar 
would have to be created in the EPEA. 
Ukraine and Georgia, for example, could 
begin by setting up a joint Permanent 
Secretariat and establishing their own 
structure so that they can function as an 
intergovernmental pillar, adopt coordinated 
positions vis-à-vis the EU pillar, and partici-
pate in the joint institutions of the EPEA. 
The EEA system – with its Council, Joint 
Committee, EEA Joint Parliamentary Com-
mittee, and Consultative Committee, as 
well as its specific modes of governance – 
is highly complex and demanding with 
regard to the capacities of the state and 
administration on both sides. Eastern Euro-
pean neighbours would only qualify for 
the EPEA if they offered similar capacities 
for cooperation with the EU. The Eastern 
European countries would therefore have 
to prove themselves reliable, in particular 
in the functioning separation of powers as 
well as the implementation and enforce-
ment of the law in a common policy and 
regulatory area with the EU. At present, this 
would still be a high hurdle, but it could 
also be an incentive to develop this capa-
bility – with targeted support from the EU. 
(3) The EEA focusses on the full and on-
going incorporation of secondary legislation 
relating to the four freedoms of the internal 
market (free movement of goods, services, 
persons, and capital). If Eastern European 
neighbours were already able to adopt the 
Internal Market acquis today, EEA member-
ship would be the preferred option and 
an EPEA would be superfluous. However, 
the EPEA would build on the AA/DCFTA, 
which provides for a gradual – and not 
necessarily full – adoption of the Internal 
Market acquis. In order to progressively 
expand the regulatory area through con-
vergence, a specific mechanism for legal 
harmonisation and effective monitoring 
would need to be introduced, which would 
provide more incentives and be more legally 
binding than under the current AA/DCFTA. 
In line with its regional and structural 
policy in the Union, the EU could set up a 
new instrument to contain regional and 
social disparities in the countries, and thus 
counteract the persistent brain drain. In 
addition, the EU could co-finance projects 
in this framework, for example to expand 
the infrastructure, and dovetail this with 
the cooperation platforms of today’s multi-
lateral public–private partnerships. The 
policies supporting the internal market are 
included in the EEA to the extent necessary 
to ensure a level playing field. But central 
policies such as agriculture, fisheries, and 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy/ 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ 
CSDP), as well as justice and home affairs 
policy remain outside the EEA and are, at 
best (as with Norway), regulated in dozens 
of additional agreements. Consideration 
should be given as to which matters are 
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transferred from the comprehensive, bi-
lateral AA/DCFTA to the multilateral EPEA. 
Addressing foreign policy as well as exter-
nal and internal security issues in the EPEA 
would give it the desired political profile 
and, at the same time, be in the interest 
of the EU. An added value to bilateral rela-
tions with the EU that are based on the AA/ 
DCFTA could also be that, as in the case of 
the EFTA, the countries of the EaP pillar 
would have a free trade relationship with 
each other. As a result, a productive dynamic 
could emerge between them. 
Outlook 
If it had been necessary to prove that en-
largement has not always been the EU’s 
most successful foreign policy, the very 
different cases of the United Kingdom and 
Turkey have done so. With both, the EU 
will develop alternatives to membership 
and special bilateral arrangements in the 
spectrum of cooperation and association: 
a (modernised) customs union with Turkey, 
and an ambitious, broad-based, deepened, 
and flexible partnership with the United 
Kingdom. With the proposed EPEA, the EU 
could also break new ground in its dealings 
with the countries of the Eastern Partner-
ship under the geopolitical considerations. 
In the future, it might even be of interest to 
those Balkan countries that get stuck on the 
ladder to membership. 
The EPEA would offer Ukraine, Georgia, 
and possibly Moldova a goal that is more 
viable than EU membership. This would cer-
tainly not solve all the problems known from 
the context of accession negotiations – 
problems arising from how the offers of 
support and the standards set by the EU 
interact with the pace of reform and the 
quality of implementation in the target 
countries. In the EPEA, the Union would 
link up with the participating EaP countries 
in a political joint venture. This would 
clearly distinguish it from the asymmetric 
accession negotiations. 
The EPEA should be open to develop-
ment in terms of its functional scope and 
governance and should permit moderate 
differentiation among the EaP countries. In 
the longer term, it could even surpass the 
EEA in terms of depth of cooperation and 
integration, and thus represent a real offer 
and not a sidelining of the EaP countries. It 
would be up to the EaP states to seize this 
opportunity and not to focus everything on 
the ultimate goal of accession. In any case, 
the EU itself could not prevent Ukraine or 
Georgia from applying for EU membership, 
in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty 
of the European Union, by explicitly reject-
ing the accession issue politically. But the 
gap between “inside” and “outside” would 
be smaller with an EPEA than it is today, and 
the ties between them would be stronger. 
Last but not least, the most plausible pros-
pect would be that this arrangement would 
bring more and quicker benefits than en-
tering into an open-ended process of acces-
sion negotiations, which could last decades. 
Dr Barbara Lippert is Director of Research / Executive Board of SWP. 
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